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1. INTRODUCTION  
The market for public procurement is large: national and subnational authorities in Europe have 
purchased about 17% of EU GDP in 2007; in other OECD economies public procurement attains a 
similar market share. Hence, efficiency gains in public procurement can bring tangible 
macroeconomic benefits. Cheaper procurement relaxes the budgetary pressure and creates fiscal 
space. In addition, industry structure may adjust and productivity increase in sectors subject to 
increasing competition among procurement suppliers.  
Despite the quantitative importance of government purchases, research on procurement is limited and 
mostly covers the theoretical or conceptual level. Dimitri et al. (2006) survey relevant theoretical 
concepts and provision schemes, discuss the pros and cons of alternative tendering procedures and 
analyse the impact of product and production characteristics on the appropriate contract design. The 
few empirical studies (e.g. Coppens, 2009; European Economics, 2006; Estache and Iimi, 2008) 
quantify the cost savings from transparency and competition in procurement markets; they conclude 
that rules and procedures that promote transparency and competition tend to reduce procurement 
prices substantially. Europe Economics (2006) estimates that EU legislation, increasing supplier 
competition, has led prices to decline by 2½-10 percent in about 20 percent of the procurement 
market.   
Based on these cost saving estimates, the present paper investigates the long-run effect of cheaper 
procurement on output, employment and consumption. The analysis uses an ex-tended version of the 
QUEST III model of DG ECFIN (Ratto et al., 2009). The extension adds a procurement sector to the 
core model; this sector supplies government purchases and the utility component of private demand 
and charges a mark-up on producer prices. 
The output, employment and consumption effects of lower procurement prices depend on how the 
government uses the fiscal space. The government may reduce taxes, increase the volume of public 
demand, raise transfer payments to households, or pay more subsidies to the private sector. The 
various policies differ in their demand and supply-side effects: lower labour and capital taxation 
tends to increase labour supply and investment; higher government consumption raises total demand, 
while government investment adds a long-run improvement of factor productivity to the demand-side 
effect; higher transfers may increase the reservation wage of workers, with a negative impact on 
labour supply; subsidies to the producers change the relative costs and prices in favour of the 
subsidised sectors of the economy. 
The paper concentrates on a scenario, where costs savings in procurement lead to lower labour 
income taxation. In addition, simulations for a reduction of the capital income tax and for higher 
volumes of government investment are presented and compared.  
The paper has the following structure: Section 2 describes the modelling of cost savings and lower 
procurement costs in the QUEST III framework. Section 3 introduces the scenarios and compares the 
simulation results for the labour income tax, capital income tax and the public investment policies. 
Section 4 summarises the results and concludes.  
2. MODELLING FRAMEWORK  
The macroeconomic implications of cost savings in procurement are analysed in an extended version 
of QUEST III (Ratto et al., 2009) that adds a procurement sector to the core model. The Graph 1 
provides a schematic overview. 
 
2 Graph 1:  Overview of the model 
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The procurement sector is a retailer: it buys goods and services from domestic production (Y), non-
commodity imports (M) and commodity imports (OIL) at prices P
Y, P
M and P
OIL and sells them at a 
mark-up to the public and private sectors (see Graph 1). Bidding costs (BC) that accrue during the 
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Increased competition between procurement suppliers reduces the mark-up they charge; it may also 
increase the bidding costs of suppliers. The simulations below therefore focus on net savings from 
procurement reform.       
The procurement retailer supplies all government purchases and the share s
P of private consumption. 
The long-run shares of non-commodity (s
M) and commodity imports (s
OIL) are assumed identical 
between the private and the public sector, as are the elasticities of substitution σ
M and σ
OIL.  
Total public consumption (G) is a CES function of non-commodity goods (NOIL) and commodities:   
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Government consumption of non-commodity goods (G
NOIL) is a CES aggregate of non-commodity 
goods produced at home (G
Y) and non-commodity imports (G
M): 
(5)  () ()()































For public investment (IG) it is analogously assumed: 
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G) and non-commodity (P
GNOIL) price deflators for the public sector follow as: 
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Private household consumption (C) is a CES aggregate of non-commodity (C
NOIL) and commodity 
consumption (C
OIL), where C
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The steady-state share of procurement in private consumption s








M. The simulations assume s
P=0.05; this value equals the share of utilities, where procurement 
legislation applies, in private consumption. Parameter σ
P is the elasticity of substitution between 
procurement and non-procurement goods and set to the low value σ
P=0.5; different values of σ
P leave 
the simulation results practically unchanged. 
The price levels of total private consumption (P





CM) follow from equations (10)-(14): 
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The procurement retailer charges - a modelling assumption - identical mark-ups for commodity and 
non-commodity goods, so that the mark-up has no direct effect on the relative prices of domestically 
produced goods, non-commodity imports and commodity imports in neither the procurement nor the 
non-procurement sector. Hence, the demand for domestic production equals: 
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where C, I, G, IG and X are private consumption, private investment, public consumption, public 
investment and exports. Non-commodity and commodity imports are: 
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The GDP deflator - including the procurement mark-up - is the demand-weighted average of 
domestic and export prices for domestically produced goods and includes the procurement retailer 
mark-up: 
(23)

















































The simulations analyse and compare strategies for the government to use the fiscal space created by 
costs savings in public procurement. The nominal government debt B evolves according to the budget 
constraint: 
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where i is the nominal interest rate on outstanding government debt, TR are transfers, τ
w is the tax on 
labour income, τ
c the VAT on private consumption, τ
k the tax on capital income and T
LS a lump-sum 
tax (see also Graph 1). In light of the costs savings, the government can either reduce the tax burden 
of households or increase real government spending, without compromising the stability of public 
debt.  
3. POLICY SCENARIOS  
Total government expenditure equals 22% and private consumption 62% of GDP in the EU-27. Circa 
17% of EU-27 GDP is procurement relevant: Government purchases and public investment account 
for 14% of GDP; 3% of GDP (around 5% of private consumption) is private demand for utilities that 
are subject to procurement legislation. 
Higher transparency and discipline in public procurement is expected to increase competition for 
work, supply and service contracts and to raise the number of bids per tender. Survey-based analysis 
in Europe Economics (2006) finds costs savings for contracting authorities of 2.5-10% of the 
intended contract value, varying across sectors and industries; the savings are a positive function of 
the number of bids per tender. The study also reports that administrative costs of participating in 
tenders have increased by 0.2% of the average contract value at the same time. Similarly, the 
econometric evidence in Coppens (2009) suggests average costs savings of 5.5% of the contract value 
from European procurement legislation reform. 
European legislation does not cover the entire procurement sector; only about 20% of estimated total 
procurement is published in the Official Journal of the European Communities and hence affected by 
the regulatory reform at the EU level. The empirical evidence furthermore suggests that gains from 
6 transparency and reform do not materialise immediately to the full extent, but need several years to 
completely phase in (Europe Economics, 2006).
1   
Based on the Europe Economics (2006) and Coppens (2009) cost saving estimates, the baseline 
scenario takes a prudent stance and assumes a 5% net cost saving, i.e. cost saving from higher 
competition net of increased bidding costs, applying to 20% of total procurement. The baseline 
scenario considers the situation, in which cost savings gradually phase in. Specifically, the 
procurement price mark-up declines in annual steps of 0.5 percentage points over a period of ten 
years, saving 0.5% of contract value in the first year and 5% of contract value from the year 10 on. 
The key scenario in this paper, which is discussed in most detail, considers the effects of a labour 
income tax cut that transfers cost savings in government procurement to the private sector. The 
scenarios of reducing capital income taxes and increasing public investment are considered in 
addition to illustrate the different effects on aggregate supply and demand components.  
In the labour and capital income tax cut scenarios, tax rates are adjusted to stabilise the stock of 
government debt at the target level b
T=0.6 and to contain deficits and surpluses of the public budget; 
government consumption and investment are kept constant in real terms:  
































For the labour tax the rule parameters are α
B=0.25 and α
DEF= 0.50; for the capital they are set to 
α
B=0.50 and α
DEF= 0.50. This choice of α
B and α
DEF ensures debt to stabilise at the target level about 
15 years after the initial shock in both cases.  
In the scenario where costs savings translate into higher real government investment, the later is 
determined as: 
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where the subscript 0 refers to values in the pre-reform steady state. The fall of P
G leads to an 
increase in IG such that nominal government spending remains constant at pre-reform levels.
2 
3.1. REDUCING THE LABOUR INCOME TAX 
In the first scenario, the tax rate τ
w on labour income decreases in reaction to cost savings in public 
procurement. The tax cut reduces the wedge between gross and net wages. Labour supply increases 
for a given gross wage:  









































   
The parameter ω is the relative weight of leisure in the household's utility function, κ
-1 the elasticity 
of labour supply, slc the share of liquidity-constrained households (LC), h captures consumption 
                                                 
1 The present analysis takes these estimates as given inputs and does not trace them back to reform-related structural changes 
in the procurement market. For discussion of the impact of market structure on procurement costs see e.g. Dimitri et al. (2006) 
and Estache and Iimi (2008). 
2 Prices of domestic goods net of the procurement mark-up (P
Y) are used instead of GDP prices including the procurement 
mark-up (P
GDP) to deflate nominal debt, so that real debt does not automatically increase as public procurement becomes 
cheaper. 
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habits, and η
W is a wage mark-up that depends on the market power of the suppliers of heterogeneous 
labour services.     
The tax cut ceteris paribus increases lifetime income and lifetime consumption of the intertemporal 
optimisers. Given the budget constraint:     
 (28)    () ()
LS
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it also raises consumption demand from liquidity-constrained households.   
As mentioned in the discussion of cost saving scenarios above, the impact of legislative reform on 
procurement costs requires time to materialise to the full extent. Table 1 presents the phase-in 
scenario, where the mark-up declines in annual steps of 0.5 percentage points (pp) over 10 years and 
then remains constant at 5 pp below the initial value for 20% of total procurement. Nominal public 
expenditure on procurement is 0.4% lower after 5 and 0.7% lower after 50 years, which following 
rule (25) implies an income tax reduction of 0.2 pp after 5 and 0.3 pp after 50 years. Real GDP, 
employment and consumption are 0.1% and 0.1-0.2% above pre-reform levels after 5 and 50 years.  
Table 1: Stepwise 5 pp mark-up reduction on 20% of procurement 
Year  Public purchases 
(nominal)  
Income 




1 -0.11  -0.05  0.02  0.03  0.01  0.03 
2 -0.17  -0.09  0.04  0.04  0.03  0.05 
3 -0.23  -0.13  0.05  0.06  0.05  0.08 
5 -0.35  -0.20  0.08  0.09  0.10  0.13 
10 -0.62  -0.34  0.14  0.14  0.18  0.17 
15 -0.64  -0.31  0.14  0.13  0.18  0.14 
20 -0.64  -0.31  0.14  0.13  0.19  0.14 
30 -0.65  -0.32  0.15  0.13  0.19  0.14 
40 -0.66  -0.32  0.15  0.13  0.20  0.14 
50 -0.66  -0.32  0.15  0.13  0.20  0.14 
Note: The numbers are percentage (percentage-point for tax) deviations from the pre-reform baseline. 
Table 2 shows the impact of an immediate 5 pp cut in procurement mark-ups applying to 20% of total 
procurement. The short-run effects are - as expected - stronger than in the phase-in scenario and long-
run effects very similar to those in Table 1. The 5 pp mark-up cut reduces the nominal expenditure on 
public procurement by 0.6% after 5 and 0.7% after 50 years; the associated tax cut amounts to 0.4 pp 
after 5 and 0.3 pp after 50 years. Real GDP, employment and consumption increase by 0.1-0.2% after 
5 and 50 years. 
Table 2: Immediate 5 pp mark-up reduction on 20% of procurement 









1 -0.61  -0.32  0.11 0.12  0.14  0.15 
2 -0.62  -0.38  0.14 0.15  0.17  0.18 
3 -0.63  -0.39  0.14 0.15  0.18  0.18 
5 -0.65  -0.35  0.14 0.14  0.18  0.16 
10 -0.66  -0.31  0.13 0.13  0.17  0.12 
15 -0.67  -0.31  0.14 0.13  0.18  0.12 
20 -0.67  -0.31  0.14 0.13  0.18  0.12 
30 -0.68  -0.31  0.14 0.13  0.19  0.13 
40 -0.68  -0.31  0.15 0.13  0.19  0.13 
50 -0.68  -0.31  0.15 0.13  0.19  0.13 
Note: The numbers are percentage (percentage-point for tax) deviations from the pre-reform baseline. 
8 The macroeconomic gains increase in an approximately linear way with the cost savings: in an 
optimistic scenario, in which cost savings apply to all procurement (Table 3), the short-run and long-
run gains are roughly five times bigger than in the case, where cost savings emerge in only 20% of 
procurement (Table 1).   
Table 3: Stepwise 5 pp mark-up reduction on 100% of procurement 









1 -0.55  -0.25  0.11 0.12  0.05  -0.16 
2 -0.85  -0.45  0.18 0.20  0.15  -0.27 
3 -1.15  -0.65  0.25 0.27  0.25  -0.39 
5 -1.77  -1.01  0.40 0.42  0.46  0.60 
10 -3.09  -1.66  0.66 0.65  0.86  0.76 
15 -3.17  -1.53  0.66 0.61  0.86  0.66 
20 -3.20  -1.54  0.67 0.61  0.89  0.64 
30 -3.23  -1.54  0.70 0.62  0.91  0.65 
40 -3.26  -1.54  0.71 0.62  0.93  0.65 
50 -3.28  -1.55  0.71 0.62  0.93  0.65 
Note: The numbers are percentage (percentage-point for tax) deviations from the pre-reform baseline. 
The employment and output effects of the tax reduction heavily depend on the elasticity of labour 
supply, κ
-1, which is shown in equation (27). In this context, the substantial uncertainty surrounding 
empirical estimates of κ
-1 should be acknowledged. The analysis of Fiorito and Zanella (2008) finds 
elasticities of 0.1 for hours worked at the individual level and of 1 at the aggregate level capturing 
changes in both employment and hours worked. Evers et al. (2008) survey estimates from about 20 
empirical studies; values for the elasticity of male labour supply vary between -0.12 and 0.45, with a 
median of 0.08, while estimates of female labour supply range between -0.08 and 1.23, with a median 
of 0.26. 
The results in Tables 1-3 adopt κ
-1=0.2. Table 4 replicates the scenario from Table 1 with κ
-1=0.1 to 
check the impact of a lower elasticity of labour supply. The results demonstrate the output, 
employment and consumption gains from labour tax cuts to be very sensitive with respect to κ
-1. 
Under κ
-1=0.1 the gains after 5, 10 and 50 years are 2-3 times smaller than the gains under κ
-1=0.2. 
Table 4 also indicates private consumption to fall initially due to temporarily lower consumption 
demand from intertemporal optimising households; the expected fall of consumer prices and 
associated increase in the real interest rate induce forward-looking households to reduce current in 
favour of future consumption. 
Table 4: Stepwise 5 pp mark-up reduction under lower elasticity of labour supply 
Year  Public purchases 
(nominal) 
Income 




1 -0.12  -0.03  0.01  0.01  -0.02  0.03 
2 -0.18  -0.07  0.01  0.02  -0.01  0.03 
3 -0.24  -0.10  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.04 
5 -0.37  -0.16  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.04 
10 -0.61  -0.27  0.06  0.06  0.09  0.03 
15 -0.61  -0.25  0.05  0.06  0.08  0.03 
20 -0.61  -0.25  0.06  0.06  0.08  0.02 
30 -0.60  -0.25  0.06  0.06  0.08  0.03 
40 -0.60  -0.25  0.06  0.06  0.08  0.03 
50 -0.59  -0.25  0.06  0.06  0.08  0.03 
Note: The numbers are percentage (percentage-point for tax) deviations from the pre-reform baseline. 
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3.1. REDUCING THE CAPITAL INCOME TAX 
Reducing the tax rate on capital income, τ
k, is an alternative way to transfer the government's cost 
savings to the taxpayer. The lower tax rate increases the net marginal return to capital. Given the 
higher return, firms increase the investment in capital, which raises the capital stock. In QUEST III 
the relevant first order condition for capital reads:  
(29)  () ()
() () ()
2
2 1 1 1 1 1
1 1
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where the variables K, i, π
І, FCY, TFP, Q and UCAP are the capital stock, the nominal interest rate, 
inflation of the investment good deflator, fixed costs of production, labour-augmenting productivity, 
Tobin's q and capacity utilisation; the parameters ε, 1-α, δ, a1 and a2 quantify the price mark-up in the 
productive sector, the output elasticity of capital, the capital depreciation rate and linear as well as 
quadratic adjustment costs.  
Table 5 reports the results for the scenario of stepwise cost savings, which corresponds to the 
assumptions in Table 1. The procurement mark-up falls by 0.5 pp per year, reaches the level of 5 pp 
below the initial baseline after 10 years and then remains constant at this lower level; the mark-up 
decline applies to 20% of the procurement sector. 
Table 5: Stepwise 5 pp mark-up reduction on 20% of procurement 









1 -0.11  -0.02  0.00  0.00  -0.08  0.08 
2 -0.16  -0.08  0.00  0.00  -0.09  0.13 
3 -0.22  -0.17  0.01  0.00  -0.09  0.17 
5 -0.32  -0.37  0.02  0.01  -0.08  0.25 
10 -0.51  -0.66  0.05  0.01  -0.06  0.38 
15 -0.47  -0.59  0.07  0.01  -0.04  0.42 
20 -0.42  -0.62  0.09  0.01  -0.02  0.48 
30 -0.35  -0.62  0.12  0.01  0.00  0.57 
40 -0.29  -0.63  0.15  0.01  0.02  0.65 
50 -0.24  -0.64  0.17  0.01  0.04  0.71 
Note: The numbers are percentage (percentage-point for tax) deviations from the pre-reform baseline. 
While employment practically remains constant, private investment increases substantially in Table 
5. The consumption gains are smaller than in Table 1 as intertemporal optimisers reduce consumption 
in favour of investment. Initial GDP gains are lower than in the case of the labour tax cut, but long-
run GDP effects are slightly higher. The positive long-run GDP effect derives from increasing 
investment. Capital deepening allows higher output at constant employment, but also requires 
replacement investment to increase. 
3.3. INCREASING PUBLIC INVESTMENT 
Re Instead of cutting taxes to transfer the cost saving from procurement legislation reform to 
households, the government can also increase real public demand. The latter comprises government 
consumption and investment. Higher public investment, I
G, increases the stock of public capital per 
efficient worker, K
G:  






t K N TFP I K 1 ln ln 1 − Δ − Δ − − + = δ
10 where δ
G and N are the depreciation rate of public capital and the population size. Public capital, such 
as infrastructure, improves the productivity of private capital and labour and increases the economy's 
output for given volumes of private capital and employment:    
(31)    () [] () () t t
G
t t t t t t t t TFP FCY K TFP FCL L K UCAP A Y
G
− − =
− − α α α 1 1
with FCL and 1-α
G as the fixed costs of employment and the marginal elasticity of output to the 
government capital stock.  
Table 6 reports results for the stepwise realisation of cost savings that underlies Tables 1 and 5. The 
price mark-up in procurement declines by 0.5 pp per year to reach the level of 5 pp below the initial 
baseline in year 10 and remains at this value thereafter; the mark-up reduction applies to 20% of total 
procurement. 
Table 6: Stepwise 5 pp mark-up reduction on 20% of procurement 









1 0.00  0.63  0.00  0.00  -0.13  -0.10 
2 0.00  0.99  0.00  0.00  -0.12  -0.15 
3 0.00  1.34  0.01  0.00  -0.12  -0.19 
5 0.00  1.99  0.02  0.00  -0.11  -0.13 
10 0.00  3.02  0.09  0.02  -0.07  -0.20 
15 0.00  2.83  0.14  0.01  -0.02  -0.07 
20 0.00  2.72  0.18  0.01  0.02  0.02 
30 0.00  2.67  0.24  0.01  0.09  0.15 
40 0.00  2.70  0.29  0.01  0.13  0.21 
50 0.00  2.76  0.32  0.01  0.16  0.25 
Note: The numbers are percentage (percentage-point for tax) deviations from the pre-reform baseline. 
The macroeconomic benefits of higher public investment materialise only with longer lags. The long-
term GDP effect (0.3% after 50 years) is bigger than in the comparable tax cut scenarios of Tables 1 
and 5, however. Government investment increases by 3% after 50 years, whereas - as with the capital 
tax reduction - employment remains constant. Private investment and consumption fall over the first 
15 years, as intertemporal optimising households loose profits from the procurement mark-up, while 
net exports increase. The long run consumption gains (0.2% after 50 years) are comparable to the 
labour and higher than under the capital tax reduction. The long-run impact on investment (0.3% after 
50 years) lies in between the impact of the two tax policy scenarios.    
Analogously to the importance of the labour supply elasticity for the macroeconomic gain from lower 
labour taxes, the supply-side effect of public investment depends on the elasticity of output with 
respect to public capital in the production function (31). The QUEST III calibration sets 1-α
G=0.09; 
higher values increase the positive long-run effect of public investment, whereas lower values would 
reduce the attractiveness of public investment as a policy option.  
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4. CONCLUSIONS  
A reform of legislation and procedures that reduces profit margins in the procurement market can 
substantially reduce costs for the public sector. The efficient use of such savings may also have 
sizable macroeconomic benefits. In the baseline scenario, a gradual reduction of the labour tax that 
transfers budgetary savings from lower mark-ups - over 10 years the mark-up falls by 0.5 pp per year 
in 20% of the procurement market - to the private sector, real GDP, employment and consumption 
increase by 0.1-0.2% above their pre-reform baseline values after 5 and 50 years. An immediately 
effective 5 pp decline of the price mark-up in 20% of the procurement market amplifies the short-run 
effect and has similar long-run implications; real GDP, employment and consumption increase by 
0.1-0.2% after 5 and 50 years. The macroeconomic impact is roughly proportional to the mark-up 
reduction; real GDP, employment and consumption gains increase proportionately to the volume of 
cost savings. The output and employment effects of the labour tax cut depend on the elasticity of 
labour supply; estimates of the latter are surrounded by substantial uncertainty. An elasticity of 0.1, 
instead of the benchmark value of 0.2, reduces the short-run and long-run macroeconomic benefits 2-
3 times. 
Lower capital taxes and higher government investment are alternative ways of using the fiscal space 
from cheaper procurement. Capital tax reductions are less beneficial in GDP, employment and 
consumption terms after 5 years, but strongly increase private investment. The long-run GDP gains 
are slightly higher than with the labour tax cut; but as consumption and employment remain close to 
pre-reform levels, the positive GDP effect is driven by the strong long-run increase in private 
investment. 
Spending the budgetary savings on additional public investment is less beneficial than the labour tax 
cut but similar to the capital tax in terms of GDP and employment effects after 5 years. Private 
consumption and investment fall in the short run. Long-run GDP gains are bigger than under the tax 
reductions. Consumption grows similar to the labour and stronger than under the capital tax rule; the 
opposite holds for investment; employment remains at the pre-reform level. Similar to the capital tax 
cut, the supply expansion derives from capital deepening without employment growth. The supply-
side effect of government investment depends on the elasticity of output with respect to public capital 
in the production function; higher values increase and lower ones reduce its positive long-run effect 
on GDP, consumption and private investment. 
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